

1941

DE.

1. No Stop message pre-authorized or authorized or potentially authorized with bombers on airborne alert or Positive Control, for use after they have received a Go order (i.e., on the ground, or in the air after receiving a "Launch" order before then on airborne alert or Positive Control).

This, in case SU receives between initiation of attack and arrival of bombers (e.g., after US missile arrival) — which might be 10-14 hours for most bombers — there is no way even to delay (or divert, re-target, or postpone or cancel) the major part, or any, of the bomber attack on the SU.

Solution: 1) ~~For~~ Put a "Cancel" message, in the ^{code} Positive Control envelope, along with "Go" code. Study and develop procedures for re-directing bomber after they have received a "Go" order.

2. Have procedures relating to Escape merges,
Positive Control, weapon safety, unauthorized action
in planes, minutes and Command Posts, been
standard in the Pacific Command as completely and
comprehensively as in NATO, CONAD and SAC?

Two years ago, the answer was strongly, No.

Procedures differed from one subordinate or
subordinate command to the next; some were
much less reliable than others. In general, the
procedures affecting the young, junior officers flying
F-100's alone were not nearly as complete as those
relating to SAC bomber crews. E.g., they did not, like
SAC, receive regular briefings on Positive Control procedures
and sign statements that they understood (interviews
showed dangerous uncertainties). Nor did they have
an "irreversible code", and so recently developed for
SAC.